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1. Introduction
Most modern developed economies have, at some point in their past, imposed some
kind of legal ceiling on the rates of interest charged on loans.1 Similar controls
have been common in modern developing economies. And, other examples of
legal limits on loan rates of interest abound, for instance in the context of Islamic
banking. The natural reaction of an economist to loan rate ceilings is to be dubious
of this kind of interference with market forces. And, indeed, many countries have
dismanteled their mechanisms for controlling the rates of interest paid on loans.
However, particularly in the context of the development process, credit markets
continue to be plagued by severe informational frictions and the rationing of credit
is endemic.2 Given these observations, and particularly given the prevalence of
interest rate ceilings over time and across countries, we propose to reopen the
question of whether it is possible for interest rate ceilings on loans to have some
beneﬁcial eﬀects. In particular, we explore the possibility that, once the general
equilibrium implications of ceiling rates on loans have been ﬂeshed out, it can
transpire that suchrestrictions promote capital accumulation, reduce the rationing
of credit, and lead to relatively high steady state welfare for all agents.
More speciﬁcally, we pursue the idea that an economy can experience socially
excessive bankruptcy costs in the absence of some government intervention. For
example, suppose that — in the absence of interest rate regulation — market rates
of interest on loans tend to be high. This would be the case, for instance, if credit
was rationed. High rates of interest on loans would then imply that loans are
relatively diﬃcult for borrowers to repay, so that the incidence of bankruptcies
would be high. Since bankruptcies consume resources it is possible that a socially
excessive quantity of resources is expended on bankruptcy proceedings.
When this occurs, ceiling rates of interest on loans can reduce the incidence
of bankruptcy, and can reduce the quantity of resources expended as part of the
costs of bankruptcy. These resources are then freed for other uses, including -but
not limited to - capital accumulation. Higher levels of capital accumulation then
raise income levels. As a result, ceiling rates of interest on loans can actually
raise the level of savings. And, when savings levels increase, more loans can be
1A particularly common example of such ceilings were usury laws.
2And, the rationing of credit is not unknown in developed economies like the U.S. See for
instance Japelli (1990).made. Thus ceiling rates of interest on loans can actually lead to an expansion of
lending, and a reduction in the extent of credit rationing.
Notice that this possibility stands in marked contrast to conventional wisdom
that loan rate ceilings will tend to reduce lending. However, this conventional
wisdom is based on partial equilibrium reasoning. In a full general equilibrium
context, we provide conditions under which the imposition of some (binding)
interest rate ceilings on loans will:
a) increase short and long-run capital accumulation;
b) reduce the rationing of credit in a steady state;
c) raise the steady state welfare of lenders; and
d) raise the steady state expected utility of borrowers.
In addition we argue that the conditions we provide are quite likely to be
satisﬁed in practice, whenever credit is rationed. Thus there are strong reasons
to think that some use of interest rate ceilings on loans can be socially beneﬁcial,
at least from a steady state perspective. And, interestingly, all of our results can
be obtained even if the economy experiences capital overaccumulation absent any
interest rate controls.
Our vehicle for examining these issues is a standard one-sector model of capital
accumulation, due originally to Diamond (1965). In addition, we structure the
economy so that only a subset of agents can produce capital, and these agents
require external ﬁnance. Moreover, the provision of external ﬁnance is subject
to a costly state veriﬁcation problem of the type considered by Townsend (1979),
Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986, 1987). Costly
state veriﬁcation constitutes a particularly explicit and simple way of modeling
costs associated with bankruptcy. And, as originally noted by Gale and Hellwig
(1985) and Williamson (1986, 1987), the presence of a costly state veriﬁcation
problem can easily lead credit to be rationed, and market rates of interest on loans
to be high. Thus the presence of a costly state veriﬁcation problem creates all of
the conditions required for loan interest rate ceilings to be potentially beneﬁcial.
Interestingly, while there is a lengthy tradition of considering ceiling rates of
interest on deposits in a macroeconomic setting [Friedman (1960), Tobin (1970),
Smith (1984) and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000)], little attention has been
devoted to ceiling rates of interest on loans. This is somewhat paradoxical in view
of the recent evidence [see, for example, Brock and Rojas Suarez (2000)] that — at
least in some developing countries — rates of interest charged on loans tend to be
very high relative to rates of interest paid on deposits. In any event, this paper
represents an attempt to bring high rates of interest on loans into the foregorund.
2The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the eco-
nomic environment, and section 3 analyzes trade in credit and factor markets.
Sections 4 and 5, describe, respectively, a general equilibrium of our economy
without and with interest rate controls. Section 6 studies the welfare implications
of imposing a binding loan rate ceiling. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. Environment
Our economy is populated by an inﬁnite sequence of two-period lived, overlapping
generations. Every generation is identical in size and composition, and contains a
continuum of agents with unit mass. Within each generation, agents are divided
into two types: “potential borrowers” and “lenders”. A fraction α ∈ (0,1)
((1 − α))of the population is potential borrowers (lenders).
Let t = 0,1,... index time. At date t a single ﬁnal good is produced in the
economy, using a constant returns to scale technology with capital and labor as
factors of production. Let Kt denote the time t capital input, and Lt denote the
time t labor input of a representative ﬁrm. Then ﬁnal output is Yt = F(Kt,L t).
The production function F satisﬁes the following conditions: it is increasing in
each argument, and F(0,L)=F(K,0) = 0 holds, for all K,L. In addition, if
k ≡ K
L is the capital-labor ratio, and if f(k) ≡ F(k,1) denotes the intensive
production function, then f￿ > 0 >f ￿￿ holds ∀k. For simplicity we assume that
the inherited capital stock at date t is used in production, and that thereafter
it depreciates completely. Moreover, only potential borrowers have access to a
technology for producing capital. We describe this technology in more detail
below.
Each lender is endowed with one unit of labor when young, which is supplied
inelastically. A young lender at date t then earns the competitively determined
real wage rate wt.
Let cL
1t (cL
2t) denote the ﬁrst (second) period consumption of a lender born at
date t. This agent then has the utility function U(cL
1t ,c L
2t). The utility function U
has standard properties: it is increasing in each argument and is quasi-concave.
In addition, we assume that consumption in each period is a normal good for
lenders.
Potential borrowers have access to a technology for converting date t ﬁnal
goods into date t+1capital. The capital investment technology has the following
3properties. First, it is indivisible and nontradable: each potential borrower has
one investment project which can only be operated at the scale q. In particular,
q>0 units of the ﬁnal good invested in one project at t yield zq units of capital
at t+1,w h e r ez is an iid (across borrowers and periods) random variable, which
is realized at t+1.W el e tG denote the probability distribution of z, and assume
that G has a diﬀerentiable density function g with support [0, ¯ z].W el e tˆ z denote
the expected value of z, i.e., ˆ z ≡
  ¯ z
0 zg(z)dz.
The amount of capital produced by any investment project can be observed
costlessly by the project owner. Any agent other than the project owner can
observe the project return only by bearing some cost. Following Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) and Boyd and Smith (1997, 1998), we assume that veriﬁcation of
a project’s return requires some expenditure of capital. In particular the return
on any project can be observed by an outsider only by expending γ>0 units of
capital.
Potential borrowers have no young period income. Therefore they require
external ﬁnance in order to operate their projects. The nature of this external
ﬁnance is described in detail below.
We assume that potential borrowers are risk neutral, and that they care only
about second period consumption (income). In addition, any given potential
borrower may fail to obtain funding for his project. In this case the agent engages
in some outside activity that generates the exogenously given utility level U ≥ 0.
The initial old agents in our economy have an aggregate capital endowment of




We assume that capital and labor are traded in competitive markets at each date.
Thus, if wt denotes the time t real wage rate and ρt is the time t capital rental
rate, the standard factor pricing relationships obtain:
ρt = f
￿(kt) (3.1)
wt = f(kt) − ktf
￿(kt) ≡ w(kt). (3.2)
Notice that w￿(k) > 0 holds and, in addition, we will assume the following.
4Assumption 1. (A1-1) kw￿(k)/w(k) < 1. (A1-2) kf￿￿k)/f￿(k) > −1;∀k ≥ 0.
Assumption 1 is satisﬁed if, for example, f is any CES production function with
elasticity of substitution no less than one.
3.2. Credit Markets
The supply of credit in this economy is simply the savings of young lenders. As
described by Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986), we can think of all savings
as being intermediated. Let rt be the gross real rate of interest on deposits made
at t and withdrawn at t +1 ,a n dl e tst be the savings of a young agent at t.
Then st is chosen to maximize U(wt − st,r tst). The ﬁrst order condition for this
problem is
U1(wt − st,r tst)=rtU2(wt − st,r tst) (3.3)
This ﬁrst order condition implicitly deﬁnes a savings function st = s(wt,r t).
Our assumption that consumption in both periods is normal implies that
0 ≤ s1(wt,r t) ≤ 1.
In addition, we assume that savings is non-decreasing in the rate of return,
and that the income elasticity of savings does not exceed unity.
Assumption 2. (A2-1) s2(wt,r t) ≥ 0. (A2-2) [ws1(w,r)/s(w,r)] ≤ 1.
The demand for credit derives from potential borrowers, who require external
ﬁnancing in order to operate their projects. Following Williamson (1986, 1987), we
assume that each potential borrower announces a set of loan contract terms. These
terms are either accepted or rejected by intermediaries: borrowers whose terms are
accepted then receive funding and operate their projects. A loan contract consists
of the following objects. First, there is a set of project return realizations At for
w h i c hv e r i ﬁ c a t i o no ft h ep r o j e c tr e t u r no c c u r sa tt. Veriﬁcation does not occur if
z ∈ Bt ≡ [0, ¯ z]−At.3 Second, if z ∈ At, then the loan repayment can meaningfully
be made contingent on the project return. Then, for z ∈ At, b o r r o w e r so ﬀ e ra
state contingent repayment schedule Rt(z), per unit borrowed. Third, if z ∈ Bt,
3Obviously we abstract from stochastic state veriﬁcation. Boyd and Smith (1994) show that
the potential gains from stochastic state veriﬁcation are small for realistic parametrizations of
the economy.
5then the repayment from the borrower to the lender cannot meanigfully depend
on the amount of capital yielded by an investment project. Thus, for z ∈ Bt
borrowers oﬀer an uncontingent payment of xt (per unit borrowed). xt can be
t h o u g h to fa st h eg r o s sr e a lr a t eo fi n t e r e s tp a i db yt h eb o r r o w e r .
Any lender can establish an intermediary. Financial intermediaries take de-
posits and make loans. In the deposit market intermediaries are competitive; they
behave as if they can obtain any quantity of deposits at the market rate of inter-
est rt. With respect to loans, intermediaries either accept or reject the contracts
oﬀered by borrowers, plus they conduct monitoring of project returns as called for
by loan contracts. In equilibrium, intermediaries will lend to a large number of
agents, and hence will earn a non-stochastic return on their portfolios. Thus they
need not be monitored by their depositors. In addition, competition for deposits
implies that intermediaries will earn zero proﬁts, in equilibrium.
Since intermediaries believe they can obtain any quantity of funds at the pre-
vailing rate of interest on deposits, it follows that intermediaries are willing to
accept loan contract oﬀers yielding an expected return of at least rt.L o a n c o n -
tract oﬀers must therefore satisfy the expected return constraint
 
At
[Rt(z)q − ρt+1γ]g(z)dz + xtq
 
Bt
g(z)dz ≥ rtq. (3.4)
Notice that expected repayments must at least cover the intermediary’s cost of





The latter term depends on ρt+1 because γ units of capital are expended when
project returns are veriﬁed. Finally, project owners must have the proper incen-
tives to correctly reveal when a monitoring state has occurred. The appropriate
incentive constraint is
Rt(z) ≤ xt; z ∈ At. (3.5)
In addition, loan repayments must be feasible, so that
0 ≤ Rt(z) <z ρ t+1; z ∈ At (3.6)
6inf
z∈Bt
zρt+1 ≥ xt (3.7)
must hold.
Borrowers announce loan contract terms to maximize their own expected util-
ity, subject to (3.4)-(3.7). The expected utility of a borrower is simply the ex-
pected value of the capital yielded by an investment project, less the expected
repayment made on borrowed funds. Thus the expected utility of a funded bor-
rower is

















where the equality follows from the fact that (3.4) must hold with equality under
an optimal contract.
Conventional arguments [Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986, 1987)]
establish that the optimal contract is a standard debt contract. That is, borrow-
ers repay principal plus interest (xtq) if this is feasible. If it is not, the borrower
defaults on his loan (declares bankruptcy), and the lender monitors the project








Rt(z)=zρt+1; z ∈ At. (3.8)






































































In order to guarantee the existence of a unique uncontingent payment   xthat
maximizes the function π we assume the following:
Assumption 3. g(z)+(
γ
q)g￿(z) ≥ 0; for all z ∈ [0, ¯ z].
Assumption 4. π￿(0) > 0.
Under these assumptions, the function π has the conﬁguration depicted in







It remains to describe the expected utility of a funded borrower under a stan-
dard debt contract. Clearly this expected utility is
q
 














































is henceforth assume to hold.
3.3. Credit Rationing
As is well known, [Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986, 1987)], in this
environment it is possible for credit to be rationed. In particular, if all borrowers
want to operate their projects at date t, the total (per capita) demand for funds
8is αq. The total per capita supply of saving at time t is (1 − α)s(wt,r t).T h u s ,
aggregate credit demand exceeds aggregate credit supply, and hence credit must
be rationed, if the following is true for all t ≥ 0:
αq > (1 − α)s(wt,r t) (3.10)
We will subsequently assume that (3.10) holds, at least at a steady state.
If there is credit rationing, then the rate of interest on loans will be bid up to












It then follows that
rt = ρt+1π(η).
In addition, the assumption (3.9) reduces to
ρt+1
 









4. A General Equilibrium with No Interest Rate Ceilings
Let µt be the fraction of borrowers who obtain funding at t. Then an equality
between sources and uses of funds requires that
αqµt =( 1− α)s(wt,r t) (4.1)
Note that the condition under which credit must be rationed (i.e., µt < 1) holds
if
αq < (1 − α)s[w(kt),π (η)f
￿(kt+1)] (4.2)











Let Kt+1 be the aggregate capital stock at t +1 .T h e n Kt+1 equals   zαqµt,l e s s








































Since kt+1 = Kt+1/(1−α), one can express this law of motion in terms of the






















Under credit rationing, this law of motion reduces to
kt+1 = s[w(kt),π (η)f
￿(kt+1)]
 








Figure 2 depicts this law of motion. Under our assumptions, the law of motion
is upward sloping, and it is easy to show that a non-trivial steady state (kt+1 =
















holds. We assume throughout that (4.6) is satisﬁed. It is also easy to show
that our assumptions imply the existence of a unique non-trivial steady state, as
depicted in Figure 2. Clearly this steady state is asymptotically stable.
5. A General Equilibrium with Interest Rate Ceilings on
Loans
We now turn attention to our primary task, which is to determine when interest
rate ceilings on loans can:
10a) promote capital accumulation;
b) reduce the rationing of credit;
c) increase the utility of lenders; and
d) increase the expected utility of borrowers.
For all of these issues except (a), we focus on steady states.
For simplicity, we assume that interest rate ceilings on loans take the form
xt ≤ xt ≡ φηρt+1, (5.1)
with φ ∈ (0,1] chosen by the government. If there is credit rationing in the
absence of a loan rate ceiling (φ =1 ), then (5.1) says that lenders are only
allowed to charge a fraction φof the “market rate of interest on loans.” Note that











T h e n ,i ft h e r ei sc r e d i tr a t i o n i n g ,t h er a t eo fi n t e r e s to nl o a n sm u s tb eb i du pt o
its return maximizing level. Thus (5.1) will hold with equality and the market
expected return on deposits will satisfy
rt = π(φη)ρt+1 = π(φη)f
￿(kt+1) (5.2)
For future reference it will be useful to remember that, by deﬁnition, π￿(η)=0 .
When an interest rate ceiling is imposed, the law of motion for the capital












Figure 3 depicts this law of motion.
5.1. Loan Rate Ceilings and Capital Accumulation
We are now in a position to study the implications of introducing a loan rate
ceiling. We begin by analyzing the consequences of such a policy for capital
4It is our intention to show that some form of interest rate ceilings on loans can be socially
beneﬁcial. To do so, it suﬃces to show that loan rate ceilings of the type given in equation (5.1)
can be beneﬁcial.
11accumulation. We ﬁrst consider the vertical shift in the equilibrium law of motion
for kt associated with a tightening of loan rate ceilings.




























































































Thus reducing φ (imposing a binding loan interest rate ceiling) shifts the law of
motion for kt up as shown in Figure 3. For future reference, it will be useful to
have an exact expression for the impact on the steady state capital stock of a
small change in φ (a tightening of the interest ceiling).



























































































































We can now state the following result.
Proposition 5.1. ∂k
∂φ|φ=1< 0.
Proposition 1 follows immediately from equation (5.9) and assumption 2. It asserts
that the imposition of a “small” but binding interest rate ceiling on loans increases
steady state capital accumulation, when credit is rationed.
The use of interest rate ceiling on loans can promote capital accumulation
in two ways. First, interest rate ceilings reduce the probability of bankruptcy
(G(φη)), and hence they reduce the level of resource expenditures on bankruptcy
proceedings (state veriﬁcation). Second, it is possible that —perhaps contrary to
intuition — interest rate ceilings reduce the extent of credit rationing, in a steady
state. This can happen because an increase in the steady state capital stock
can increase the savings of lenders. We now investigate how steady state credit
rationing varies with φ.
5.2. Loan Rate Ceilings and Credit Rationing












13where µ is the fraction of potential borrowers who obtain funding, in equilibrium.





















































































































It then follows from assumption 2 that
∂µ















O r ,i no t h e rw o r d s ,
∂µ


























we can now summarize this result in
14Proposition 5.2.
∂µ
∂φ |φ=1≤ 0 h o l d si f( 5 . 1 5 )i ss a t i s ﬁ e d .
Thus, in particular, a small reduction in φ (the imposition of a small but
binding interest rate ceiling) will reduce steady state credit rationing if the interest
elasticity of savings is not too large. Since all empirical evidence suggests that
the interest elasticity of savings is quite low, it is empirically very plausible that
the use of small interest rate controls can reduce the amount of credit rationing
that occurs, in a steady state equilibrium.
Armed with these results we can now turn our attention to our primary task:
showing when the use of interest rate ceilings on loans can increase the steady
state expected utility of all agents.
6. Steady State Welfare
Lender Expected Utility. We begin by investigating the impact of ceiling rates
on the steady state welfare of lenders. A lender￿s utility in steady state is
U {w(k) − s(.),f
￿(k)π(φη)s(.)}≡V (φ), (6.1)





































b yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m .





































It follows that the steady state utility of lenders is decreasing in φ (at φ =1)i f
capital’s share of total income exceeds the fraction of total income saved. Plausible
values for capital’s share of income in most economies would be at least 0.25, and
few economies save more than 25% of their total production. We can therefore
conclude that, in almost all contexts, (6.4) will be satisﬁed, as a practical matter.
Thus the use of small but binding loan rate ceilings can reasonably be expected
to increase the steady state welfare of lenders.
Borrower Expected Utility. We now investigate the impact of interest
rate ceilings on the steady state expected utility of borrowers. Recall that µis






































































16Now substitute (5.12) into (6.6) to get
W
￿(φ)=µf













































































Since π￿(η)=0 , since
1 >

















∂φ |φ=1< 0 both hold, we therefore have W￿(1) < 0 if U is not large. Or, to
summarize, small binding loan rate ceilings improve the steady state welfare of a
borrowers if the value of a borrowers’ external option, U, is not too large.
If we are willing to impose additional assumptions on the production tech-
nology, then it is possible to show that W ￿(1) < 0 holds, independently of the
magnitude U, so long as (3.12) and (5.15) are satisﬁed. In particular, the follow-
i n gr e s u l ti sp r o v e di nt h ea p p e n d i x .
Proposition 6.1. Suppose that the production function has the Cobb -Douglas
form f(k)=Bkβ,w i t hβ ∈ (0,1), and suppose that (3.12) and (5.15) hold. Then
W ￿(1) < 0.
17Thus binding loan rate ceilings will increase borrower expected utility, in a steady
state, if the ﬁnal goods production technology is Cobb-Douglas, and if such ceilings
reduce credit rationing, in a steady state.
6.1. Discussion
We have now established that a small binding interest rate ceiling on loans in-
creases steady state capital accumulation, and reduces steady state credit ra-
tioning under quite plausible conditions. In addition, such loan rate ceilings in-
crease the steady state welfare of lenders if the economy’s savings rate is not too
large. And, they increase the steady state welfare of borrowers if their utility
is not too high when they fail to receive funding. Or alternatively, interest rate
ceilings on loans raise the steady state welfare of borrowers if the ﬁnal goods pro-
duction technology is Cobb-Douglas, and if such ceilings reduce credit rationing,
in a steady state
Thus, if credit is rationed, it is quite plausible that bankruptcy (state veriﬁ-
cation costs) are socially excessive, from the perspective of steady state welfare.
These bankruptcy costs can be reduced, and steady state welfare can be improved
by the use of interest rate ceilings.
6.2. Steady State Capital Underaccumulation
It is well-known that, in overlapping generations models, there can be capital
underaccumulation, from a steady state perspective. In conventional overlapping
generations models, capital will be underaccumulated, in a steady state, if the
real rate of interest on savings exceeds the steady state real rate of growth.
It follows that a natural question, in our context, is whether any or all of
the results stated thus far depend on there being capital underaccumulation
[π(η)f￿(k) > 1] in a steady state? Or, in other words, do the conditions under
which V ￿(1) < 0 and W￿(1) < 0 imply capital underaccumulation?













































But clearly (6.10) does not imply the violation of any of our previously stated





G(η) >π (η) holds. Thus a binding loan rate ceiling can
raise the steady state utility of all agents, even if there is capital overaccumulation
[π(η)f￿(k) < 1] in the steady state.
7. Conclusions
During their process of economic development, many currently developed economies
had a history of legal ceilings on loan rates of interest. A particularly common
manifestation of such ceilings took the form of usury laws. In modern times,
a number of developing economies have also imposed an array of interest rate
controls.
It is natural to suspect that legal controls on interest rates interfere with
the market allocation of funds and, therefore, that they have largely negative
consequences for an economy. However, we have presented a model in which,
under empirically plausible conditions, legal ceilings on rates of interest that can
be charged on loans a) promote steady state capital accumulation; b) decrease the
rationing of credit, in a steady state; and c) increase the steady state (expected)
utility of all agents.
The intuition underlying these results is simple. In economies where unregu-
lated market rates of interest are quite high - as might transpire when credit is
rationed - it will be relatively diﬃcult for borrowers to repay loans. As a conse-
quence, bankruptcy rates will also be high. Since bankruptcies generate social as
well as private costs, it is possible that a socially excessive quantity of resources
is expended on bankruptcy proceedings; monitoring, a veriﬁcation of asset values,
etc. If ceilings are imposed on loan rates of interest, bankruptcy rates can be
reduced and a resource saving can result. Some of the resources saved can be
redirected to capital formation. And, as the capital stock rises, so will incomes
and savings (if the interest elasticity of savings is not too high). As a result,
credit rationing will become less severe. This, along with lower rates of interest,
is the source of the expected utility gains for borrowers that arise from interest
rate regulation.
19It bears emphasis that none of our results depends in any way on the magnitude
of bankruptcy costs - the veriﬁcation cost parameter γ p l a y sn op a r t i c u l a rr o l e
in any of the results described above. It is also the case that - with two possible
exceptions — we have made no special assumptions to obtain our results. In
particular, we have used an absolutely conventional model of capital accumulation
[Diamond (1965)], and an absolutely conventional model of bankruptcy costs: the
costly state veriﬁcation model of Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984), Gale and
Hellwig (1985), and Williamson (1986, 1987).
Our analysis does make use of the two special features. First, credit is ra-
tioned. This feature of the model does not seem central to our results, although
it does substantially simplify their proofs. Moreover, credit rationing seems to be
a common characteristic of credit markets, particularly in development contexts,
and so it is not an empirically implausible aspect of the analysis.
Second, we have assumed that state veriﬁcation uses capital. We note ﬁrst
that this is a common assumption in the relevant literature.5 Moreover, it too
is not essential to our results. The main point is that resources are freed when
bankruptcy costs are reduced. We do not believe that it matters whether it is
capital or labor that is freed, or a combination of both, although the assumption
that state veriﬁcation consumes capital substantially simpliﬁes the analysis. What
does mater is that the factors of production freed by lower bankruptcy rates can
be redirected to other, socially more productive uses. Hence the potential beneﬁts
of legal limitations on loan rates of interest.
5See for instance, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) or Boyd and Smith (1997, 1998).
208. Appendix: Proof of Proposition 6.1.







































It follows from proposition 5.2 that, if (5.15) is satisﬁed, then
∂µ
∂φ |φ=1< 0 holds.































if (5.15) is satisﬁed. Therefore, W ￿(1) < 0 holds if the hypotheses of the proposi-























Then, upon substituting (5.9) into (8.2), it follows that W￿(1) < 0 holds if















































=( 1− β). It is then apparent






≥ 1 − α. (8.4)
But this follows from assumption 2. This establishes the claim.
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